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APPELLATE COURTS INSIDE AND OUT
Maxwell L. Stearns*
INSIDE

APPELLATE

COURTS:

THE

IMPACT

OF

COURT

ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED

AP PEALS . By Jonathan Matthew Cohen. Ann Ar
bor: University of Michigan Press. 2002. Pp. xii, 231. $55.

STATES COURTS OF

I.

INTRODUCTION

While the United States Supreme Court has been the object of
seemingly endless scholarly commentary,1 the United States Courts of
Appeals are just now coming into their own as a subject of independ
ent academic inquiry.2 This is an important development when one
considers that the vast bulk of relevant precedents governing most
federal court litigation comes not from the Supreme Court, but rather
from the United States Courts of Appeals. Because relatively few
courts of appeals decisions are reviewed in the Supreme Court,3 with
* Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. B.S. 1983, University of Penn
sylvania; J.D. 1987, University of Virginia. - Ed. I would like to thank Michael
Abramowicz, Lloyd Cohen, Dick Ippolito, John Klick, and Vered Stearns for helpful com
ments and suggestions.

1. Providing cites for this obvious proposition would risk excluding many outstanding
works that have focused upon that institution.
2. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635 (1998). Within this literature, and for reasons that
this Review makes plain, the Ninth Circuit has been a particular focus of attention. See, e.g.,
Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68
CAL. L. REV. 937 (1980); Stephen Wasby, Communication in the Ninth Circuit: A Concern
for Collegiality,

11

U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 73 (1987).

3. For the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2001, the Supreme Court had
6,298 petitions for review or writ of certiorari filed plus 2,736 petitions for review or writ of
certiorari pending as of October 1, 2000, for a total of 9,034. Of these, the Court granted 219,
denied 5,658, and dismissed 47, leaving 3,110 petitions pending. See Petitions for Review or
Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the
12 Month Period Ending September 30, 2001, tbl.B-2, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus20
01/appendices1602sep01.pdf (last visited May 21, 2003). For an alternative set of statistics for
the same year, see The Supreme Court 2001 Term - The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453,
460 (2002). Table II (B) reports 82 petitions for writ of certiorari granted out of 1,890 con
sidered on the Supreme Court's appellate docket (4.3%); 6 petitions for writ of certiorari
granted out of 8,023 considered for the total docket (1.1 %). Id. Table II (C), which carries
over the total 88 cases "on review," further reports 70 summary dispositions (excluded from
Table II (B)). Table II (B) includes cases carried to the 2001 term from the prior term, but
not cases granted review in the 2001 term but carried over to the 2002 term, and further ex
cludes cases within the Court's original jurisdiction. Id.
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rare exception, the federal circuit courts provide the functional
equivalent of that Court's proverbial "last word."4
It is tempting to treat the federal circuit courts as a set of mini
Supreme Courts to which a massive body of available scholarship can
readily be applied. But this would be a mistake. The courts of appeals
are unique institutions, sandwiched between the Supreme Court and
the district courts, which operate on the front lines of federal court
litigation. As such, the federal appeals-courts warrant - indeed
demand - independent analytical treatment. It is against this back
ground that students of the federal judicial process must heartily wel
come Jonathan Matthew Cohen's study of the United States Courts of
Appeals.
In Inside Appellate Courts, Cohen, a sociologist and practicing
attorney, asks a question that has received scant attention in the
academic commentary on appellate judging: If we accept the dominant
conception of appellate court judging as a process of atomistic con
templation, how do federal circuit court judges continue to maintain
high quality opinions in the face of pervasively growing judicial dock
ets? Cohen advances the provocative thesis that increasing workloads
have not prevented appellate judges from producing high-quality
outputs, but rather, that the dominant image of appellate judging as an
isolated contemplative task is conceptually flawed. A better approach,
he argues, is to compare the task of appellate court judging to produc
tion within a multidivisional private firm.5 While Cohen recognizes the
inherent limits of his analogy, and in particular, that unlike private
firms, circuit courts lack a central coordinating authority (pp. 22, 212),
he nonetheless contends that it is more fruitful to consider judges as
workers in a complex organization than as autonomous actors reflect
ing in isolation on the legal issues presented on appeal (p. 22).
Cohen's methodology is sociological, rather than either doctrinal
or economic. As such, Cohen focuses much of his discussion and
analysis on questions that are of particular concern to those interested
in court culture, administration, and governance: Does the prolifera
tion of cases threaten to undermine the quality of appellate court
output, assuming that it has not done so already? How do appellate
courts simultaneously accommodate ever growing dockets while main
taining the proper balance between individual judicial reflection and
4. I am referring, of course, to Justice Robert Jackson's famous, nay infamous, assertion
that "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
5. Pp. 30-34. Cohen's model of the sociology of the appellate courts thus draws heavily
from such works as NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL
(1990); W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS
(1981); Neil Fligstein, The Spread of Multidivisional Form Among Large Firms, 50 AM. Soc.
REV. 377 (1985); Richard E. Walton & John M. Dutton, The Management of Interdepart
mental Conflict: A Model and Review, 14 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 73 (1969).
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collegial deliberation? How does court size, which ranges from 6 in the
First Circuit to 28 in the Ninth Circuit (p. 17), affect the ability of
those courts to speak with a unified voice? Cohen focuses on these
thematic questions throughout his study. Cohen also asks a series of
concrete policy questions: Should the circuits be further subdivided to
avoid the cumbersomeness of some of the larger circuits, especially the
Ninth Circuit?6 Should Congress add a further appellate layer between
the circuit courts and the Supreme Court?7 Should Congress create
new appellate courts of specialized jurisdiction? (p.14). Is the Ninth
Circuit experiment, authorized by federal legislation,8 of allowing
mini-en bane panels of 11 within an active court of 28,9 to review panel
decisions of 3, sound given the risk that a simple majority of 6 might
bind that circuit to a minority position? Does the increasingly common
practice in several circuits of sharing bench memoranda among the
panelists threaten to compromise the judges' individual assessment of
the merits? (pp. 94-95). Does the increased frequency of bypassing
oral argument and· of issuing summary dispositions threaten to
compromise the dispensation of justice?10
It would be difficult for any student of the judicial process to deny
the importance of these questions. And Cohen does not merely ask
important questions. His larger task is to draw upon organizational
theory to develop an original model intended to address these
questions by considering the structure and organization of federal
appellate courts. And yet, these questions are largely removed from
the central inquiries about federal appellate courts that typically have
concerned lawyers and legal scholars. The latter group has been more
frequently concerned with how appellate courts transform preferences
into doctrine; the nature of cases that are likely susceptible to further
appellate process through en bane, mini-en bane, or Supreme Court
review; and how best to evaluate appellate court opinions.11 More
·

6. Pp. 14, 218 (rejecting recommendation of the COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF.APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 47 (Dec. 18, 1998) to
administer the Ninth Circuit through regional subdivisions).
7. Pp. 14, 218 (rejecting proposal advanced in Martha J. D ragich, Once a Century: Time
for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11 (1996)).
8. P. 182 n.22 and accompanying text (noting that Congress authorized the mini-en bane
procedure, which allows fewer than the full complement of circuit court judges for circuits
with more than 15 active judges, 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2000), and that only the Ninth Circuit
uses this procedure); see also 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.
9. Circuit judges who have taken senior status are excluded from the en bane
mini-en bane) process.

(or

10. Cohen acknowledges that the judges he interviewed were hesitant to define such
abstract concepts as justice or equity. P. 180.
11. It might surprise legal scholars reading this book that Cohen cites but a small
handful of cases to support his black-letter statements concerning the standards of appellate
review. Seep. 47 nn.20-25.
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significantly, It IS not obvious that Cohen's organizational theory,
drawing upon studies of the sociology of the firm, always provides the
best means of assessing those policy questions that Cohen has chosen
to address. While organizational theory provides a useful starting
point, insights drawn from other methodologies, including economics
(demonstrating how decentralized informational processes can pro
vide more meaningful data), probability analysis (demonstrating the
quality of data drawn from subsets of a larger group), and social
choice (demonstrating the nature and limits of group decisionmaking),
might prove more fruitful in evaluating. at least some of these ques
tions.
Cohen's study of the internal structure of appellate courts is help
ful in identifying those dynamics that allow these important institu
tions to accommodate simultaneously the growing demand for case
resolutions amid exploding dockets with the 'persistent command that
individual judicial attention to each case is required to promote justice
and equity. Cohen's focus on internal court dynamics is important be
cause it is the tension between the dual "myths"· of a burgeoning
workload crisis and the isolated contemplative role of the ideal judge
that has motivated the vast bulk of proposals for ambitious (some
times radical) court reform (pp. 215-16). For students interested in
how internal appellate court dynamics affect the formation and
soundness of doctrine, however, it is equally important to consider
external constraints that shape and discipline judges operating within
collegial circuit courts.12 A comprehensive understanding of federal
appellate judging therefore requires not only an understanding of the
circuit courts' internal organizational structure, butalso an analysis of
the edifice of circuit court decisionmaking from inside and out.
' This Review proceeds as follows. Part II briefly surveys Cohen's
methodology and thesis. Part III draws from three complementary
disciplines - economics, probability analysis, and social choice13 - to
provide complementary means of assessing several of the more salient
policy questions that Cohen considers and compares these methods
against Cohen's sociological analysis� I concl�de Cohen's model is
fruitful in assessing the sociology of appellate courts. What makes his
model particularly powerful is that it can be combined with other
models, drawn from related disciplines, to further our understanding
of appellate courts in a manner that addresses questions of concern
not only to students of court administration and culture, but also to
lawyers and legal scholars.
1 2 . For an important study on the nature of lawmaking in collegial courts, see Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II: Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441 (1992).
13. A proper understanding of the separation-of-powers model applied in this Subpart
reveals that it is a unidimensional issue spectrum model considering the median preferences
of two institutions rather than one, thus fitting within a social-choice framework.
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II. INSI D E APPELLATE COURTS
Cohen begins his project by identifying a widely shared impression
that the federal circuit courts are in crisis (pp. 5-8). That crisis, Cohen
observes, grows in considerable part from the inability to reconcile
two increasingly prevalent myths surrounding appeals court judging.
The first myth involves the nature of appellate judging itself. The
standard lore of judging begins with the observation that while district
court judges, sometimes with a jury and sometimes without, try cases
as individual jurists, appellate judges resolve legal issues presented on
appeal in panels of three. And yet, appeals-court judges, who review
questions presented on appeal based upon generally agreed upon
standards of review,14 are simultaneously held to an ideal of atomistic
contemplation. Each appellate judge reviews the briefs, the record on
appeal, and the bench memorandum (prepared by his or her own law
clerk), in an effort to decide how the appeal should best be resolved.
Generally, only after reaching this initial determination does the judge
then interact with the other panelists, first at oral argument, which is
open to the public, and then at conference, which is not. And it is gen
erally only at this final stage, after the judges have made their individ
ual assessments, that the panel as a whole determines how the case is
to be resolved and then assigns the initial task of producing an opinion
to one of the members.15 In this traditional conception of appellate
court judging, the individual effort each judge gives to the case,
followed by interaction with counsel, and only then collaboration with
the other panelists, are each indispensable steps in the process through
which appeals courts mete out justice and equity.
The second myth is that the burgeoning caseload in the federal
circuit courts have produced a workload crisis that is difficult, perhaps
impossible, to reconcile with the ideal vision of the lone ranger judge.16
Thus, the number of federal appeals-court judges has risen from 132 in
1981 to 167 in 1991, where it remained stable through 2000 (p. 7 tbl.1).
Meanwhile, in 1981 the courts of appeals confronted 26,362 appeals
filed, 25,066 appeals terminated, and 21,548 appeals pending. Com
pare that to 54,697 filed, 56,512 terminated, and 40,410 pending in
2000. So while federal circuit court size has increased by 19% in nine
teen years, in the same time frame, circuit court dockets have
increased by 107% (measured by cases filed), 125% (measured by
cases terminated), or 61% (measured by appeals pending).
14. As Cohen correctly observes, these standards afford considerable deference to the
trier of fact, whether judge or jury. Pp. 46-48.
15. Following Supreme Court practice, within the circuit courts, the chief judge or senior
active j udge in the majority assigns the opinion. Pp. 72-73.
16. Cohen identifies Benjamin Cardozo, Learned Hand, and Oliver Wendell Holmes as
examples of heroic appellate judges who satisfied this ideal. P. 172.
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Cohen's project is to evaluate whether these and related data
support various ambitious proposals for judicial reform, or instead
whether the circuit courts have developed (or are in the process of de
veloping) sufficient modest accommodations to meet the burgeoning
caseload burdens while continuing to honor the proper appellate court
role. To answer this question, Cohen looks closely at several actual
judicial responses to the growing dockets, some of which are described
below. Cohen concludes that the widely held perception that any
number of radical reforms are needed to allow appeals court judges to
mete out justice in the face of ever expanding dockets is misplaced and
that, through a series of incremental accommodations, the courts
themselves have provided mechanisms for adaptation that are supe
rior to those most frequently advanced by various court reformers.
Throughout the book, Cohen presents two forms of data. Most
significantly, Cohen presents his own data, developed through numer
ous interviews with judges, clerks, and secretaries on the United States
Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits (and a single judge on the First Circuit). Participation was
entirely voluntary and not surprisingly incomplete.17 With respect to
these data, Cohen anticipates the objection of sample bias, but notes
that there is no evidence to corroborate that claim (p.17 n.81). While a
fair reading of the book appears to support Cohen's assertion, the
manner in which these data are presented makes it difficult to know
that with certainty.
Cohen presents his data in the form of quoted excepts from repre
sentative interviews. One difficulty is that Cohen does not quantify his
data. While Cohen occasionally informs the reader that the speaker
embraces a minority, or even a unique position,18 Cohen does not
develop his interviews into a statistical database against which to
assess more generally the numerical strength of various majority or
minority positions.19 The result is a set of interview excerpts that pro
vide the reader with an informative but impressionistic sense of what
representative judges, clerks, and court staff think about present court
operations and various proposals for judicial reform.
17. Cohen notes that within the circuits he studied, he requested interviews with all ac
tive judges and many senior judges and that participation varied from circuit to circuit. P. 16.
In the Seventh Circuit, he interviewed 8 out of 11 active judges and on the Ninth Circuit, he
interviewed 24 out of 39 active and senior judges. P. 16. In the D.C. Circuit, he interviewed
only one-fourth of the active judges and in the First Circuit he interviewed 1 judge. Pp. 1617. Cohen maintains the secrecy of his interview subjects throughout the book, including
such matters as the jurists' race or sex. P. 19 n.83.
18. Cohen notes, for example, that there was only a single dissenter within the Ninth
Circuit from the practice of sharing bench memoranda. P. 95.
19. In an e-mail, Mr. Cohen explained that quantification might tend to mislead given
the small sample size and the fact that during the interview process, which he conducted in
person, not all questions were presented to all judges in the same form. E-mail from
Jonathan Cohen to Maxwell Stearns (Feb. 2, 2003) (on file with author).
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Cohen's second set of data is taken from various published materi
als from the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
Throughout the book, Cohen presents these data, which are not origi
nal to his study, in the form of accessible tables. These data largely
focus on the workload of the various circuit courts of appeals and pro
vide a helpful backdrop against which to evaluate Cohen's interview
data and policy analysis.
To support his claim that minor innovations are preferred to
radical court reform, Cohen considers how the judges themselves
evaluate various innovations in light of suggested alternatives.20 The
most commonly advanced alternatives are subdividing large circuits,
especially the Ninth Circuit; adding a further appellate layer between
the circuit courts and the Supreme Court; and allowing the circuits to
review panel decisions with less than the full complement of active
members. Of these three approaches, only the last has been imple
mented. The Ninth Circuit employs a mini-en bane procedure that
allows randomly drawn panels of eleven out of the full active court of
twenty-eight to review panel decisions of three.21
The unique characteristics of the Ninth Circuit make it a particu
larly important subject in Cohen's study. Indeed Cohen frequently has
more interesting things to say about that court than about the circuit
courts in general. The discussion of other circuits sometimes serves as
a backdrop against which to evaluate the particular problems that now
confront that singularly large court, and that perhaps confronted the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit when it
had twenty-five judges prior to being subdivided into the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits (p. 183).
Several recent innovations have been widely adopted within the
federal circuit courts. Among the most common responses to the
conflicting demands for isolated judicial contemplation and ever in
creasing production burdens have been increased delegations to staff,
and particularly to law clerks (p. 10); sharing of bench memoranda
among the chambers of participating panelists (p. 94-101); and reduc
ing the percentage of cases submitted for oral argument and given full

20. Cohen's approach thus raises the question as to who the intended beneficiaries of
court reform are? If the intended beneficiary is the public at large, then an analysis of the
likely quality of judicial outputs, rather than of judicial satisfaction with the process that
gives rise to those outputs, might be a more meaningful inquiry. To answer that question,
economic analysis in its various forms might prove more helpful than Cohen's interview
based approach. By way of analogy, if one were evaluating the performance of a firm, it
would appear less fruitful to ask the managers if they are pleased with the firm's internal
structure and decisionmaking processes than to inquire as to how the firm has fared in the
relevant market or markets in which it is engaged.
21. The selection process is not entirely random. The chief j udge is always included in
the mini-en bane, p. 1 82, thus giving a statistical edge to whichever side of the ideological
spectrum the chief judge favors.
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disposition status.22 In each instance, Cohen recognizes that even these
seemingly minor accommodations have not come without cost. Cohen
notes that the growing professionalization within each judicial cham
ber - which begins to resemble a mini-law firm (pp. 27-30) - results
in the judge acting more like a manager than like an individual jurist
scholar reflecting in isolation on how best to resolve the often complex
legal issues presented on appeal. In addition, Cohen posits that the
growing reliance on clerks for both bench memoranda and opinion
drafts threatens to undermine judicial collegiality and the individual
attention that judges are able to devote to each case. While the judges
themselves generally have vast and deep experience in the law before
arriving on the bench and are each subject to presidential appointment
and Senate approval, law clerks are largely unregulated. Judges gener
ally select their own clerks,23 who most often have strong academic
credentials from top law schools, to work for one year prior to enter
ing private practice or some other legal career.
As Cohen observes, the difficulty with increasing reliance on law
clerks is not merely the fact of delegation by those with Article III
status to those without,24 but rather the additional supervisory respon
sibility that can distract judges from their central task. Some have even
speculated that judges can assign law clerks an outcome, thus avoiding
the hard work of determining whether the law provides a convincing
basis for getting there. Cohen explains:
Overreliance on law clerks may have a "big impact" on the final judicial
opinion. First, ... this overdelegation enables judges to make decisions
without carefully considering the logical or legal reasons for doing so.
While judges traditionally have had to agonize over how a decision can
be justified, now they merely can decide the case and ask their clerks to
agonize over justifications. Second, delegating the initial opinion-drafting
responsibility to clerks may seriously and adversely affect the opinions'

11; internal citation omitted)
Increased judicial caseloads also threaten to undermine collegial
ity. Cohen identifies two aspects of collegiality that are threatened:
first, the civility with which judges maintain their relationships; and
second, and more importantly, the ability of judges, working together,
to generate outputs that could in theory "represent the unenhanced
clarity and style. (p.

22. Pp. 60-63 tbl.3: Percentage of Appeals Terminated on the Merits in the U.S. Courts
of Appeals After Oral Hearing by Circuit; pp. 76-79 tbl.4: Percentage of Appeals Termi
nated on the Merits in the U.S. Courts of Appeals Without Published Opinion.
23. At least one judge has instead assigned the task of selecting clerks to a committee of
law professors. P. 90.
24. And of course this problem is not unique. It has been noted that elected members of
Congress routinely delegate major functions to staff, and often read only committee reports,
drafted largely by staff members, rather than the actual bills upon which they vote. For a
general discussion, see Daniel Farber & Philip B. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 439 ( 1 988).
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effort of a single person," and that are the product of meaningful
"collaboration and deliberation."25 In addition, an increase in court
size itself threatens to undermine judicial reflection and collegiality.26
This threat appears especially acute in the Ninth Circuit, which has
twenty-eight judges, and which in recent years has witnessed the
Supreme Court's lowest approval rating.27
As have multidivisional private firms, the circuit courts have de
veloped several methods of accommodating a changed working envi
ronment. In addition to reliance on clerks, Cohen observes that it is an
increasingly prevalent practice among the circuit courts for the
members of a three-judge panel to share a single bench memorandum
(p. 94). This allows each chamber to prepare memoranda in roughly
one third of the cases assigned to the panel, rather than having one
clerk in each chamber independently brief each case.
And yet, Cohen observes that the mere fact of circulation among
chambers changes the process of drafting the bench memorandum. At
least one Ninth Circuit judge noted that the circulated memorandum
requires more work because it represents the chambers (p. 95). As a
result, the judge in the originating chambers is more likely to have a
hand in influencing the reasoning expressed in the memorandum (p.
107). In other chambers, the judge allows the memorandum to circu
late entirely as the clerk's work product with no judicial imprimatur
(p. 108). Whether or not the judge reads the memo prior to distribu
tion, the fact of external circulation encourages greater detail than
might be appropriate if a clerk, aware of his or her own judge's juris
prudential predilections, were drafting solely for internal use. Some
judges have complained, for example, that circulated memoranda are
simply less useful to them than those prepared solely for use within
the chamber by their own clerks and therefore have law clerks pro
duce comment memoranda that respond to the circulated memoranda
(pp. 101-03).
Circulated memoranda also affect the incentives of other judges on
the panel. Some judges tend to back load case preparations when their
clerks are not responsible for preparing the circulated bench memo
randum (p. 107). This tendency not only delays preparation, but might
also promote reliance on the circulated bench memorandum, at least
until shortly prior to oral argument.

25. P. 12 (quoting Lewis Kornhauser & Lawrence Sager, The One and the Many:
81 CAL. L. REV. l, 3, 5 ( 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

Adjudication in Collegial Courts,

26. Cohen distinguishes geographic from numerical dispersion; the latter threatens to
undermine collegiality more so than the former. Pp. 152-66.
27. For a comprehensive treatment of the Ninth Circuit approval rating, see Richard A.
Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 71 1 (2000).

May 2003]

Appellate Courts Inside and Out

1773

In addition, many circuits have increased their reliance upon visit
ing judges (pp. 194-95 tbl.7). This helps to reduce the workload on ac
tive circuit members, but again does not do so without cost. As Cohen
observes, from the perspective of the sitting circuit court panelists, not
all visitors are created equal. Those visiting from other circuit courts
of appeal are treated less skeptically than those visiting from the dis
trict courts. This is partly because members of other circuits have like
experience and prestige (p. 193), and partly because those visiting
from district courts often find the work of the circuit court to be a
distraction from their main task of deciding cases at the trial level (p.
197). Some circuit court judges also expressed concern that district
court judges tend to view the case from the trial court perspective,
rather than from the perspective of an appeals court evaluating identi
fied claims of error (p. 198). And even visitors from other circuits can
pose problems. Visiting circuit judges sometimes believe that their
own circuit has adopted a superior approach to a particular question
of law, and seek to foist their view on the circuits they are visiting (p.
196). Cohen's anecdotal evidence suggests that this attitude tends to
create resentment among the host judges who generally prefer to
resolve such issues on their own (p. 196).
Almost all of the circuit courts have reduced the percentage of
cases given oral argument and full disposition treatment, including
published opinions (pp. 60-63 tbl.3; pp.76-79 tbl.4). While none of the
quoted judges claim to give short shrift to cases that are decided on
the briefs, the general rule preventing citation of unpublished opinions
(pp. 73, 81) clearly affords judges more leeway by reducing the need
for precision in setting forth the governing rationale.28 Again, this
practical accommodation does not come without cost. Cohen notes
that commentators have criticized the reduced percentage of pub
lished opinions on the ground that it poses a threat to the legitimacy of
the judicial process (p. 74).
Of all the accommodations that Cohen discusses, perhaps the most
ambitious is the Ninth Circuit mini-en bane regime. Authorized by
Congress, this regime allows the court to empower eleven judges,
rather than the full complement of twenty-eight active judges, to re
view panel decisions of three. And while the circuit could, in theory,
vote for a full-en bane if dissatisfied with the rulings of a mini-en bane
panel, Cohen reports that each of the three post mini-en bane requests
for such review has failed (p. 189). Some members have concluded
that this fact alone reveals the efficacy of the mini-en bane regime (p.
189). And perhaps from the perspective of the participating judges,
28. Thus, Cohen observes, "Because the judges put far less effort into writing and edit
ing their unpublished dispositions, their reasoning often is less tightly written, and phrases
sometimes indicate broader statements about the law than the writing judge or other panel
members would allow in a published, citable opinion." P. 79.
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that is correct. What the sociological data cannot identify, however,
are the precise tradeoffs in expediency associated with the mini-en
bane versus the resulting loss in meaningful representation of the
full-en bane court. Cohen ultimately recognizes this as a statistical
problem (p. 187), but he nonetheless relies upon quoted excerpts from
judges regarding their overall satisfaction with the mini-en bane
regime, rather than analyzing the problem in terms of probabilities.29
Just as private firms alter their internal structure to improve their
functioning in a changing external environment, Cohen argues that
these generally modest accommodations (holding aside for now the
mini-en bane) reveal the flexibility and adaptation of the various
circuit courts of appeals. And as with private firms, each of these
developments can be ascribed to a changed condition that required an
institutional response by those who are most concerned with meeting
those changed circumstances while also ensuring, as much as feasible,
consistent quality of output. Cohen's broadest claim is that each of
these changes, which admittedly reduce the level of attention that
individual judges devote to each case, is acceptable because the task of
appeals-court judging, as in a private firm, is ultimately one of joint
production.
In the next Part, I will consider three other approaches to appellate
court decisionmaking, which individually and in combination will help
to assess the strengths and limitations of Cohen's organizational thesis.
Specifically, these three approaches will help to evaluate Cohen's
major claim that the observed innovations, each intended to accom
modate growing judicial dockets in the circuit courts of appeals, are
preferred to seemingly more bold proposals for circuit court reform. I
will focus on three of the most significant of these innovations: shared
bench memoranda; the increased use of summary dispositions; and the
Ninth Circuit mini-en bane procedure.

29. At one point, Cohen states: "One response to the problem of the mini-en bane is
that, once it is agreed that any number less than a full court is acceptable, deciding how large
the panel should be is merely a matter of statistics." P. 187. But then he goes on to para
phrase a Ninth Circuit judge who
stated that the court had done

a study that

concluded that statistics suggest that eleven

judges closely represent the views of the whole court and that to increase the probability that
a panel with fewer than the full complement would represent the whole, the panel would
need to have fifteen judges.

P. 1 88. While Cohen never cites this study, he goes on to state "[t]hat judge suggested that
the small marginal benefit of adding more judges would not be worth the added inherent
difficulties." Id..

Appellate Courts Inside and Out
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INFORMATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COLLECTIVE CHOICE

A.

The Economics of Generating Information

Throughout his study; Cohen evaluates the soundness of several
innovations according to the satisfaction of the judges, who he
assumes to be most directly affected, as reflected in the interviews. In
evaluating many aspects of judicial culture, including several that are
discussed in his book, this approach appears sound. Thus, for example,
it would be difficult to assess satisfaction with the physical structure of
various judicial chamber configurations (pp. 118-21), the appropriate
tasks within chambers that law clerks perform (pp. 118-21), or the best
methods of judicial communication concerning pending cases (pp. 15460), without asking the 'judges themselves. No other obvious bench
marks besides the satisfaction of jurists emerge. But Cohen does not
ask the question whether his methodology is optimally suited to all of
his questions about the nature of appeals court judging. And for some
of the questions, I would suggest, the interview approach yields data
that are simply less fruitful than ·data or insights that emerge from
other, complementary, methodologies.
Let us begin with shared memoranda. As explained in the prior
Part, Cohen presents numerous and lengthy interview excerpts con
cerning judicial satisfaction with the recent trend in several circuits of
assigning one chamber per panel to prepare a single memorandum in
each case, and then circulating that memorandum among the cham
bers of the panelists. While the general support for the practice is not
unqualified, and while some judges have their clerks produce supple
mental memoranda that respond to the somewhat generic and less
targeted circulated bench memoranda, Cohen's data suggest consider
able support among chambers for this regime.
And yet, a simple economic model helps to identify potential costs
that might not be well captured in Cohen's data. In the course of pre
senting his interview excerpts, Cohen identifies several important
propositions related to sharing bench memoranda among chambers.
Many jurists point out the obvious, namely that the practice reduces
work by about two-thirds, at least if you assume that the practice does
not change the amount of work going into each memorandum (pp. 9495). Others point out the flaw in this very assumption, noting that the
fact of circulating the memoranda requires greater judicial attention
by the originating chambers than was the case when such memoranda
were used solely within the chambers (p. 96). And several jurists noted
that the resulting memoranda tended to be less useful because they
were pitched to a broader audience and because they therefore had a
substantial tendency toward overinclusiveness (p. 96). At least one
judge, clearly expressing a minority position among those for whom
interview excerpts were presented, claimed that the traditional regime
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of preparation within each chamber was superior because redundancy
itself is an affirmative good that has been deliberately built into the
system of appellate judging (p. 100).
The difficulty, of course, is in evaluating these competing claims.
Even if we identify substantial costs associated with the shared memo
randum practice, there might be no "right" answer in evaluating
whether the benefits of reduced work within each chamber outweigh
the costs. But it would certainly be helpful in undertaking a policy
analysis of that sort to identify just what the relevant tradeoffs are.
And in this instance, an economic model might well prove more fruit
ful than asking the participating judges who are particularly sensitive
to workload.
The analysis rests only upon the assumption that the actors in
question are rational, taking their preferences as given. While that
might be a contestable proposition, it builds upon Cohen's analogy of
appellate judging to production in a multidivisional private firm. Of
course, economists are unlikely to evaluate firm performance by ask
ing managers how they think they are doing. Rather, they are likely to
assess performance according to objective market indicators. And
since even that task can be exceedingly difficult, economists often
employ simple models designed to predict how certain changes in firm
behavior or in the external environment in which the firm is operating
are likely to affect market performance.
In this instance, we have a single change in the behavior of the
court/firm, namely a reduction in the number of data generated prior
to the critical decisionmaking junctures - oral argument and confer
ence - that precede the drafting and issuance of the opinion. Rather
than having three independently generated bench memoranda, one to
each judge, as a principal information source prior to oral argument,
we now have a single memorandum shared among the chambers.
Without suggesting that federal circuit judges, or even their clerks, are
unable to evaluate quality and to reject shoddy work product, we can
see that in private markets, the baseline assumption is that multiple
independently generated data points are more effective than a single
datum in producing and conveying meaningful information concerning
such matters as the value of commodities, the accuracy of news ac
counts, or the soundness of positions advanced on ballots or in cam
paigns.30
Rather than having a central organizing authority try to surmise
the scarcity of, and demand for, resources, open markets allow count
less individual actors, operating in the absence of any central coordi
nating authority, to transact at prices that buyers and sellers individu30. Elementary courses in economics generally begin with the determinants of price in
large part because they are conceptually easy to present. But the principles apply as well to
any number of data.
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ally - and with mutual assent - deem appropriate to the goods or
services in question. One major benefit of generating information as to
value in this decentralized and uncoordinated manner is that countless
subjective valuation measures - reflected in the individual transac
tions - produce an objective valuation that can be tested in the mar
ketplace.31 Thus, if an individual seller subjectively valued a commod
ity more highly than the prevailing market price, she could try,
generally without success, to secure that higher price in the market.
Holding all else constant, price theory predicts that such efforts are
destined to fail. Conversely, another seller who values the commodity
less highly than the prevailing market price could enter her goods in
the market at a discount Holding all else constant, the demand for her
goods would then be infinite. The seller could then altruistically con
tinue to sell at the reduced price until she runs out, or she could rec
ognize her ability to raise the price to that prevailing in the market,
and sell as much as is profitable at that price.
Thus, if we assume complete competition and indistinguishable
goods, the only relevant question, and the one that the market is well
suited to answer, is valuation, or price. And price is best provided in a
decentralized market in which multiple independently derived data
points allow us to confirm or deny the validity of any one person's
subjective valuation as an alternative proxy for value. Of course,
judges do not produce a simple price datum; instead, they produce
opinions that resolve disputes and establish precedents. And it is not
always true that private actors making individual decisions produce
ideal information. Recent studies in experimental economics have
shown for example that decentralized decisionmaking can sometimes
produce cascade effects.32 In the absence of information, and pre
sented with some datum, consumers will often assume the available
datum to be true and treat it as such. This can advantage an early posi-

3 1 . As is standard, the discussion assumes the absence of negative externalities.
32. For a general discussion, see TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1995); Abhijit V. Banerjee, A
Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797 (1992); Sushil Bikchandani et al.,
Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, J.
ECON. PERSP., Summer 1998, at 151; and Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). One author has recently
described the phenomenon as follows:

Social groups move rapidly towards a set of beliefs that may be unsupported by evidence, in
a process that is like a chain reaction or cascade of disinformation, and which is
self-reinforcing. This effect is generated by a number of factors, including the difficulty of
becoming fully apprised of all evidence, the difficulty of assessing this evidence, the empha
sis placed upon recent information due to cognitive processing shortcuts such as the "avail
ability heuristic," deference to socially-dominant influential information arbiters, and con
cerns about reputation and social standing in the event of disagreement.
Dan Hunter, Philippic.com, 90 CAL. L. REV. 61 1 , 621-22
SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001) (internal citations omitted)).

(2002) (reviewing
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tion relative to its merit.33 Cascade analysis has thus been used to ex
plain, for example, such phenomena as reactions to published accounts
of global warming and dubious claims about the cause of the spread of
AIDS in Africa.34 But notice that the predicate to information cas
cades is a dearth of meaningful and independently generated informa
tion, and the presentation of some source of information, whatever its
quality, to fill the void. The tendency is to assume available informa
tion to have ·merit until it is disproved, often through the discovery of
superior and falsifying alternative information.35
I do not intend to imply that the shared-bench-memorandum re
gime ensures an information cascade. As stated previously, Article III
judges are generally extremely well-educated and critical thinkers. But
the shared bench memorandum regime changes the flow of informa
tion in a significant way. In assessing the impact of this change, it will
be helpful to consider an important appeals court norm that Cohen
also identifies. In his discussion of court culture, Cohen explains that
judges decline to discuss the merits of a case prior to oral argument
(pp. 131-33). A simple economic analysis reveals that the shared
memorandum regime provides a mechanism through which ambitious
judges can subvert that important court norm. In so doing, it provides
the other judges with information about the preferences of one panel
ist, which would take agreement of both remaining panelists to defeat.
The analysis begins with the assumption that within any given
three-judge panel, at least one judge is likely acquiescent, and at least
one judge is likely dominating. By acquiescent, I do not intend to
imply intellectual laziness or sloppiness. It is quite possible, for exam
ple, that a visiting judge, or a judge who has not been on the court for
a long time, might tend to defer to those whom he or she believes have
a greater institutional understanding, or that he or she prefers to have
the court speak with a unified voice even if occasionally that requires
subordinating his or her own views. The likelihood of an acquiescent
judge is perhaps enhanced as a result of the recent trend toward
increased reliance upon visiting judges, but the analysis that follows is
certainly not dependent upon that development. A dominant judge,
on the other hand, is one who if afforded the opportunity, will attempt
33. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 685-86 ("An information cascade occurs
when people with incomplete information on a particular matter base their own beliefs on
the apparent beliefs of others.").
34. See Hunter, supra note 32, at 621-22; Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 723;
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299,
312.
35. I do not mean to suggest that there is a binary choice between meaningful decen
tralized, and misleading coordinated, information. In most instances, information sources fall
between these two extreme endpoints, and for some inquiries, those that are scientific and
falsifiable, the number of persons who embrace a position is a meaningless indicator of
quality.
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to persuade other judges to adopt her viewpoint in an effort to secure
a desired case resolution and precedent. While in any given panel it is
possible to have all dominant or all acquiescent judges, I will assume
for the analysis to follow that each panel has at least one of each, and
then consider the implications of the shared memorandum regime.
Assume an acquiescent judge receives a memorandum from the
submitting chamber and that the remaining chamber does not
respond. Silence can either signal that the third judge is also acquies
cent or that he or she agrees on the merits. In either case, the known
acquiescent judge is likely to assume that two out of three judges are
satisfied with the analysis in that memorandum. This increases the
probability that the judge in question will enter oral argument inclined
toward that view of the case. Now assume instead that after the
memorandum circulates, the remaining chamber responds negatively,
for example by submitting a memorandum objecting to the analysis
contained in the bench memorandum in some important respect. The
submitting chamber might respond negatively, in which case the
acquiescent judge will inevitably confront two competing views
expressed by two dominant judges. Alternatively, the submitting
chamber might not respond or might respond favorably. In that case,
the acquiescent judge is likely to take the signal as favoring the views
of the responding judge. If we set aside the case of two dominating
judges expressing disagreement, the other two cases - two judges
agreeing with the memorandum and two judges disagreeing with the
memorandum - produce a signal that the third, acquiescent judge is
likely to find important in entering the next phase of the appellate
process.
Now contrast the traditional regime in which each chamber pre
pares its own memorandum without sharing. In this regime, the judges
enter oral argument without any written submission revealing how
another panelist, or her clerk, views the case. Assume a clerk within
each chamber submits a memorandum to his or her judge, and that the
memoranda are regarded as sound by the judges receiving them. If the
memoranda agree, then barring some unanticipated response at oral
argument, the judges are likely to prefer the outcome that is consistent
with the memoranda. If the memoranda disagree, then the judges will
enter oral argument with at least two competing views of the case.
This is likely to generate a mor.e active and engaging oral argument,
and also to encourage the judges to find some basis for reconciling the
differing approaches. It is entirely possible that one of the judges will
dominate the panel, but at a minimum, the judge whose initial inclina
tion was to view the case differently will have to report back to the
clerk that she has changed her view of the case. This is likely a minor
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cost, but it is a cost nonetheless, and one that is reduced - if not
eliminated - in the shared-memorandum regime.36
The analysis reveals that the shared-memorandum practice
imposes a cost of reducing the flow of independently generated infor
mation, in favor of coordinated and shared information. The regime
saves the cost to clerks of preparing memoranda in each case, and in a
regime with growing dockets, judges are acutely aware of this benefit.
A similar analysis confronts the increased tendency toward memo
randum dispositions without .oral argument. Both features of this
practice - bypassing oral argument and declining to publish the
resulting opinions - reduce the information associated with applying
precedents to new fact patterns that arise in actual cases. Certainly the
judges themselves are well suited to identifying which cases are impor
tant in the evolution of doctrine and which are instead straightforward
applications of existing principles of law.37 But multiple applications
even of well-understood doctrine can expose important nuances. And
at a minimum, more published opinions provide litigants with more
information concerning relevant rules of law. Anecdotal evidence sug
gests that lawyers will invest in assembling data concerning unpub
lished legal materials.38
These elementary economic intuitions are certainly not sufficient
to answer the question whether the costs of shared memoranda and
memorandum dispositions outweigh the benefits, but they do demon
strate a real cost that is not well captured in the data Cohen has
assembled, and they further reveal how those data are likely biased
against weighing what might be a significant cost. In the next Section, I
will demonstrate how probability analysis can edify Cohen's discussion
of another, and more ambitious, innovation: the mini-en bane.
B.

A Probability Analysis of the Mini-En Banc Procedure

With congressional authorization, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a
mini-en bane procedure that allows eleven judges out of twenty-eight
to reconsider a three-judge panel decision. Cohen spends considerable
time in the book on this particular innovation (pp. 162-63, 182-91, 20809, 216-19), which appears to be the most ambitious of those that he
discusses, and perhaps the most ambitious that the federal circuit
courts have yet adopted to deal with the workload crisis. It is easy to
36. Cohen notes that one judge stated that "by not communicating his initial views of a
case to his brethren, he has not committed himself to a view, and he can more readily change
his mind without the embarrassment of admitting to his colleagues that his initial view was
incorrect." P. 132.
37. And notice that judges sometimes publish "reminder" opinions that involve easy
factual applications when such opinions have not been issued for some time. P. 75.
38. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Tax Court S Cases: Does the 'S' Stand for Secret?, 79
257 n.5 (1998).

TAX NOTES
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identify the potential flaw with this regime. A minority of the full
court, consisting of six judges out of eleven on the mini-en bane, can
bind the circuit to a position that, in theory, as many as twenty-two
judges reject. If we assume that the traditional procedure of allowing
the entire court en bane to review the decisions of individual panels is
designed to ensure that either intracircuit splits or egregious examples
of outlier rulings are corrected consistently with the overall prefer
ences of the circuit,39 this suggests that at least part of that formulation
is violated with mini-en bane review. Setting aside associated problems
of intransitive voting'preferences,40 as a general matter, it is practically
impossible for an en bane court to engraft a minority position onto the
law. While a mini-en bane can cure intracircuit conflict, as several
judges have noted, the regime also threatens to empower minorities
on the court to express the rule of law (p. 186). Nonetheless, as with
the other innovations described throughout the book, the Ninth
Circuit judges appear generally satisfied with the regime. The diffi
culty is in identifying practical solutions to the problems that have
been identified. Cohen recognizes the problem as statistical (pp. 18788), and at one point, quotes a judge who claims that a Ninth Circuit
study established the need to raise participation from eleven to fifteen
out of twenty-eight judges to solve the representation problem
(p. 188). It turns out that the solution is not so easy, and that a fairly
simple probability analysis reveals why.
In this Part, I will employ a hypergeometric distribution to demon
strate the probability that a given mini-en bane panel will achieve a re
sult contrary to that which would have been achieved with the full
Ninth Circuit sitting en banc.41 The probability analysis will not be
complete. In particular, I will not recount every possible combination.

39. This formulation admittedly begs an important normative question, albeit one that
Cohen declines to address, namely: What is the purpose of en bane review? Obvious candi
dates include increasing the likelihood that circuit court decisions are "correct" based upon
some agreed-upon normative criterion; increasing the likelihood that circuit court rulings
anticipate probable Supreme Court rulings; and reducing the incidence of outlier panel rul
ings and intracircuit conflict. Michael Abramowicz has challenged these formulations in a
recent article and proposed instead that en bane decisions should mirror the overall
preferences of all federal circuit j udges, a goal that is promoted by increased reliance upon
visitors. Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 CO LUM . L. REV. 1600 (2000). My own
view is that en bane review should instead reflect the j urisprudential views of the active
members of the deciding circuit court. This approach increases the probability that when
splits of authority arise among the circuits (bearing in mind that panel rulings are themselves
disciplined in part by anticipated en bane rehearings), they are genuine and not based upon
such happenstance factors as a random draw, which would be the case if visitors were al
lowed to vote on en bane panels, and which is the case with the mini-en bane review.
40. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE
ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 106-11 (2000) (illustrating multidimen
sionality and asymmetry in Supreme Court opinions).

4 1 . I am particularly indebted to Lloyd Cohen, Dick Ippolito, and John Klick for
helping to formulate the probability analysis set out in this Subpart.
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Rather, I will highlight some particularly problematic cases in which
the mini-en bane procedure threatens to codify a minority position,
and then evaluate the nature of the changes required to avoid the
problem. In the end, I will suggest a possible improvement to the mini
en bane procedure, one that admittedly imposes some significant
administrative costs. Whether the problems with the mini-en bane as
presently formulated warrant a shift to such an alternative regime, or
the adoption of some other solution,42 is of course a policy question
that no model can answer. But the analysis is sufficient to establish
the limits of the interview-based methodology, in contrast with a
probability analysis, in identifying the tradeoffs relevant to such a
policy analysis.
I will present the findings in two ways. Table 1 shows the probabil
ity that an odd numbered mini-en bane of increasing size (depicted in
the left horizontal column and ranging from eleven to twenty-seven
judges) will achieve a contrary resolution to that achieved in an en
bane court of twenty-eight for various levels of consensus within the
larger court (depicted along the top numbered row).43 The totals are
listed across each row for the mini-en bane panel of each designated
size and matched to each level of consensus that produces a given out
come on the full court. It is important to emphasize that embedded in
the analysis is a normative assumption that the purpose of the mini-en
bane is to mirror the outcome that would likely be reached if the full
court decided the case en banc.44 If we accept that premise, then the
data reveal that in close cases (defined here as 15-13 voting "yes" in
the full-en bane), the eleven-judge mini-en bane threatens to
undermine the preferences of the en bane court as much as 38 % of the
time. This is of course problematic. But it is all the more disturbing to
realize that in such a close case, an en bane of thirteen would likely
achieve the wrong result 36% of the time, an en bane of fifteen would
likely achieve the wrong result 34 % of the time, an en bane of seven
teen would likely achieve the wrong result 32% of the time, an en
bane of nineteen would likely achieve the wrong result 29% of the
time, an en bane of twenty-one would likely achieve the wrong result
25 % of the time, an en bane of twenty-three would likely achieve the
wrong result 21 % of the time, and an en bane of twenty-five would
42. Obvious candidates include dividing the Circuit; employing subdivisions within the
Ninth Circuit and leaving the en bane court as a mini-Supreme Court that resolves splits
among the subdivisions; and rejecting the mini-en bane regime in favor of a full-en bane,
perhaps limited to ruling solely on the pleadings.
43. Because a "no" outcome could arise in the mini-en bane under any combination in
which a majority achieves that outcome (for example in an eleven-judge panel, it could occur
if a majority elects "no" based upon votes of 6-5, 7-4, 8-3, 9-2, 10-1, and 1 1-0), these possible
no votes have been tallied to reveal the probability of the mini-en bane court achieving the
"wrong" answer.
44.

See supra

note 39.
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likely achieve the wrong result 14% of the time. Rather than solving
the problem, in a close case for a twenty-eight member court a move
from a mini-en bane of eleven to a mini-en bane of fifteen would
merely reduce the likelihood of an incorrect result from 38% to 34% .45
A 15-13 split for the court as a whole, of course, presents the
worst-case scenario for the likelihood of a wrong outcome. The prob
ability that the eleven-judge panel achieves a result contrary to the full
court diminishes as the consensus level within the full-en bane court
rises. Table 1 again provides the relevant data. The data reveal that
the mini-en bane court is 38% likely to get the wrong result if the full
court is split 15-13; 27% likely to get the wrong result if the full court
is split 16-12; 18% likely to get the wrong result if the full court is split
17-11; 10% likely to get the wrong result if the full court is split 18-10;
5% likely to get the wrong result if the full court is split 19-9; and 2%
likely to get the wrong result if the full court is split 20-8. Beyond that
level of consensus, the chances of error are minuscule. When two
thirds or more of the judges want to vote "yes," there is no more than
a 5 % chance that an eleven-judge mini-en bane panel will get the
"wrong" result. Otherwise, the probability of a contrary result greatly
increases as demonstrated above.
One could reject the significance of these data by assuming a high
level consensus in the general run of cases. Whether or not that is
correct, the answer is not entirely satisfying. It is quite likely that
closely divided cases are more significant, at least in terms of salience,
and therefore that the contrary resolution by a mini-en bane matters
most just when the mini-en bane is most likely to get the wrong result.
Before leaving the probability analysis, it is helpful to recognize
that it is not possible to know the consensus level within the full-en
bane court, at least absent review at that level. It is possible, however,
to know the outcome within the mini-en bane, and then to assess the
probability that the outcome for that consensus level is contrary to
that for the entire en bane court for any given level of consensus.
Table 2 shows that in cases that would produce a 15-13 margin for the
entire court, an en bane decision of 6-5 is 24 % likely to be incorrect;
an en bane decision of 7-4 is 11 % likely to be incorrect, an en bane
decision of 8-3 decision is 2.7% likely to be incorrect, and beyond that
the likelihood of an incorrect decision is extremely low.46 One possi
bility short of eliminating the mini-en bane for increasing its probable
accuracy is to posit an acceptable benchmark of consensus within the
45. Readers can use the same table to determine the effect of increasing the size of the
mini-en bane panel for higher levels of consensus within the full twenty-eight judge court by
selecting a consensus level from the top-numbered row and then reading down for each ad
ditional increment in size of the odd-numbered mini-en bane panel.
46. Using the same technique described supra note 45, readers can use this table to as
sess probabilities of an incorrect result for various consensus levels within the mini-en bane
of eleven for higher consensus levels within the full court.
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mini-en bane panel itself and to require an increase in the sample size
if the benchmark is not met.47 If, for example, we accept a 5 % prob
ability of error, but not a larger one, then one could envision a regime
that works as follows. If a mini-en bane ruling arises with fewer than
eight in the majority, the court can either reinstate the three-judge
panel decision or vote again for a full-en banc.48 In either case, the
mini-en bane will not be controlling. I am not advocating this regime,
but rather, am suggesting it as one intermediate solution to the prob
lem of representation that confronts the mini-en bane.
It is important to emphasize that nothing in this analysis answers
what is perhaps the most critical question: Are the benefits of the
mini-en bane sufficient to outweigh the costs? But the analysis does
suggest that asking the judges their views might not provide a very
compelling basis for assuming the answer to be yes. The mini-en bane
procedure is time saving and helps to preserve the Ninth Circuit as a
single court. Most judges seem to agree that absent this procedure, en
bane proceedings would be a near impossibility on the present 28
judge court.49 If so, then this might raise anew proposals - admittedly
more radical - to either formally split the Ninth Circuit, or to treat
that court as managing two or more internal mini circuits, each with its
own body of precedent. But in one sense, the solution to split the cir
cuit is Jess radical than the mini-en bane. Circuits have been split in the
past, and other than the cumbersomeness of adding a fourteenth fed
eral circuit,50 and perhaps one that embraces a single state,51 this would
47. For descriptions and applications of a Simon two-stage design, used for testing the
efficacy of drugs, see Richard Simon, How Large Should a Phase II Trial of a New Drug Be?,
71 CANCER TREATMENT REP. 1 079 ( 1 987); Richard Simon, Optimal Two-Stage Designs for
Phase II Clinical Trials, IO CONTROL CLINICAL TRIALS 1 (1 989). Simon's technique involves
taking a small sample size - fourteen in the studies under review - and then basing the
need for a larger sample size on the response. If no patients experience a desired response,
the study ends at stage I. If instead some patients experience a desired response (generally
no more than one to three will do so) then the test proceeds to stage II, which increases the
sample size. In the two-stage trial, if at least cine patient obtains the desired result out of
fourteen, then there is a chance of 20% efficacy, which can be confirmed or denied with a
larger sampling. A similar principle can be applied to the mini-en bane regime. If the favor
able response within the smaller eleven-judge sample is too low, for example anything less
than an 8-3 outcome, then the probable accuracy of the result can be tested by increasing the
sample size to the full twenty-eight-judge en bane court.
48. While it is true that a random three-judge panel is less likely as a matter of probabili
ties to reflect the full twenty-eight-judge court's preferences, this is a general feature of cir
cuit court practice and is not one that pretends to reflect the preferences of the full court sit
ting en bane.
49. This might be less of a problem if en bane proceedings were based entirely upon the
pleadings and thus without oral argument, as my colleague Michael Abramowicz has sug
gested. Abramowicz, supra note 39. But there might well be resistance to denying oral ar
gument in the small class of salient cases that warrant full-court review.
50. Presently we have eleven numbered circuits, plus the District of Columbia and Federal Circuits.
·

5 1 . One particular anomaly that confronts the Ninth Circuit is that dividing the court
would likely result in a single circuit consisting entirely of California.

Appellate Courts Inside and Out

May 2003)

1785

entail no major alteration in the present practices in the circuit courts.
The same cannot be said for the mini-en bane, which represents a sub
stantial departure from the practice in other circuits. Likewise, the
intermediate step of treating the Ninth Circuit as a mini-Supreme
Court above two or more internal subcircuits deviates from the stan
dard practice of the other circuits. At a minimum, the analysis suggests
the need for further study, and I would argue, for additional discipli
nary approaches in the cours� of that study.
C.

The Economics of Generating Doctrine

Most students of courts are interested in the nature and determi
nants of judicial doctrine. For these readers, Cohen's project is par
ticularly interesting because it reveals how the processes of judicial
crafting of doctrine can be affected by growing dockets and by the
increased size of existing courts. The mini-en bane, the decline in full
disposition opinions, and the increased use of visiting judges, all have
the potential to change the most important aspect of judging, namely
the opinions that judges produce and the rule of law that those opin
ions announce. While this is not a question that Cohen takes up di
rectly, he suggests throughout his book that collegiality is an important
factor in judging. And certainly collegiality is not important for its own
sake, but rather it is important for its impact on the processes and end
product - judicial opinions - of appellate court decisionmakillg. In
this Section, I offer a preliminary model, drawn from the separation
of-powers and social-choice literature, that will help to consider just
how these developments might affect the ultimate transformation of
judicial preferences into legal doctrine.
The separation-of-powers model predicts probable Supreme Court
rulings according to whether Congress is likely to change the result by
enacting a contrary statute.52 The model assumes that both the Court
and Congress can be cast along a single-normative-issue dimension,
such that for each branch, one can identify something like a median
member, whose preferences govern.53 When the Court anticipates that
52. For useful presentations of this model, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1 992), and William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & John Ferejohn, Virtual Logrolling: How the Court, Congress, and the States Multiply
Rights, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 545 (1 995).
53. The purpose here is not to defend or challenge these obviously strong assumptions,
but rather to consider whether the framework of the model is helpful in evaluating judicial
lawmaking in the circuit courts. As with all economic models, the assumptions driving this
one are contestable. It is not at all obvious that Congress is best characterized as an institu
tion with preferences that rest along a single dimension. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 370-71 (1997). And in deciding individual cases and groups of
cases, it is demonstrable that the Supreme Court frequently possesses preferences that rest
along multiple dimensions as well. See STEARNS, supra note 40, at 106-11 (demonstrating
with individual cases); 1 70-98 (demonstrating with groups of cases over time). And even if
we assumed that both institutions operated along single dimensions, it is not obvious that
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a preferred ruling, consistent with the preferences of its median mem
ber, falls outside of the median range for Congress, its options are to
cast the ruling in constitutional terms, thus preventing an overruling,54
or to move the decision closer to the legislative median to "insulate"
the judicial ruling. So viewed, the Court's members are not merely
internally strategic,55 but are simultaneously strategic respecting as a
coordinate branch.
Ironically, the assumptions required for the separation-of-powers
model are weaker and thus more plausible when the model is
extended to apply to circuit courts because in this context only one
institution is involved. It is entirely plausible, although not inevitable,
to assume that if the court views the case as resting along a single-issue
dimension, subgroups within that court will also view the case as rest
ing along the same analytical dimension. We can therefore think of the
Ninth Circuit as having three potential levels of participation, a full-en
bane of twenty-eight judges, a mini-en bane of eleven of twenty-eight,
and a panel of three of twenty-eight. As with the Supreme Court, it is
certainly unlikely that the Ninth Circuit, or any other appeals court,
systematically possesses preferences that can be cast along a single
normative issue dimension.56 But for the analysis to follow, let us as
sume that this is the case, or perhaps more accurately, let us assume
that the following analysis applies when this is true.
We can now intuit a game in which members of a three-judge
panel (in the absence of a mini-en bane procedure) try to contemplate
not only their own dominant position, but also the relationship of that
position to the expected median of the entire en bane court.57 Along
whichever substantive issue dimension on which the case rests, the
panelists could be "strategic" not only respecting each other, but also
respecting the larger court. Specifically, if the preferences of the most
liberal member of a conservative panel or of the most conservative
member of a liberal panel are a significant distance from the preferthey operate simultaneously on the same dimension. Thankfully, it is not necessary to de
fend the separation of powers model here. It is only necessary to explain the basic intuition.
54. Within the framework of social choice, this involves casting the decision along a
separate analytical dimension.
55. For relevant discussions of strategic voting within appeals courts, see FORREST
MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT (2000), and Evan H.
Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV.
2297 (1 999).
56.

See STEARNS, supra

note 40, at 1 06-11.

57. This is a major distinction from the general analysis of the Supreme Court, which
heavily emphasizes the position of the median justice. In a liberal panel of three in which all
panelists agree to a ruling that is consistent with the views of the most conservative member,
or in a conservative panel of three in which all panelists agree to a ruling that is consistent
with the views of the most liberal member, the preferences of those members, rather than of
the median member, might be controlling if the objective is to create a precedent while re
ducing the likelihood of further appellate review.
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ences of the en bane court's median member, then the members can
strategize as to how far they can depart from the median position
while avoiding the likelihood of an en bane rehearing. This problem is
generic in that it confronts all outlier three-judge panels on larger cir
cuit courts.
The more interesting problem is identifying how, if at all, this
calculation is affected by adopting the mini-en bane regime. In this
regime, from the perspective of an outlier three-judge panel, there is
considerably less certainty as to the full court's controlling median
position because en bane review is effectively limited to the random
draw of at least ten of the eleven judges.58 While it appears unlikely
that the random draw would systematically generate either extreme
wing of the court, at a minimum, there exists the possibility of a
broadening of the effective median.59 If we assume the ability to rank
all twenty-eight judges along a single liberal to conservative dimen
sion, then the true median would sit at positions fourteen and fifteen.
In the mini-en bane, in contrast, the median range potentially expands
from position six on the left to position twenty-two on the right. And
even if we assume that most of the mini-en bane medians are closer to
the true full-court median, the net effect of the regime change is still to
broaden the effective median to a considerable extent. The result is to
remove substantial restraint from outlier panels that inevitably emerge
through a process of random drawing by providing those panels a
broader cushion of acceptability - or a lower probability of overrul
ing - relative to a traditional en bane regime.
A similar set of incentives confronts the mini-en bane itself. While
the Ninth Circuit has never granted a full-en bane review of a mini-en
bane decision, it is certainly possible that some day it will. And it is
likewise possible that the mini-en bane panelists, with this in mind,
strategically align their decisions closer to the median position on the
Ninth Circuit as a whole than to the median position of the mini-en
bane panel when there is a considerable issue space between the two.
This of course raises an empirical question, but at a minimum, it sug
gests a possible countervailing force to the starkest predictions that
assume a minority of six within the mini-en bane has free reign to bind
the circuit. This tendency might be tempered by the very same incen
tives that an outlier panel has to reign in its decisionmaking suffi
ciently to reduce the risk of a further step of internal appellate re
view.60
58. See supra note 2 1 .
5 9 . A probability analysis o f each potential median draw in a three-judge and
eleven-judge panel is beyond the scope of this Review.
60. It is of course also possible that the circuit courts, or even the panels within those
circuits, to some extent play a similar game in an effort to reduce the probability that the
Supreme Court will grant the losing party's petition for certiorari. This incentive, however,
confronts all circuits and not just the Ninth Circuit.
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While I have focused primarily in this Section on the role of the
mini-en bane, the analysis suggests a more general point. In evaluating
the Supreme Court, commentators are prone to imagining that the
median jurist has near limitless power.61 This is not surprising given
that as a general matter that Court hears all cases en bane. In theory,
the circuit courts could empower their median justices in much the
same manner. But to do so would require heightened use of en bane
proceedings. To the extent that this assumption is relaxed when we are
analyzing the federal circuit courts, either because the frequency of en
bane review is low or because the circuits employ a procedure that
allows a subset of the whole to review three-judge panel decisions, the
effect is to broaden the effective median on circuit courts to a larger
number of jurists. This affords panels considerably more flexibility
within the circuit, at least if we assume as a primary goal the desire not
to be overturned. The model might suggest that circuit courts are less
predictable in turning preferences into doctrine than is the Supreme
Court. And among the circuits, larger courts would appear less
predictable than smaller courts. The Ninth Circuit in particular would
appear to be even less predictable as a consequence of the mini-en
bane procedure. While this analysis cannot resolve the policy debate
over the wisdom of the · mini-en bane, at a minimum it exposes an
important cost that Cohen's interview data has not fully uncovered.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Along with Cohen, this Review has spent a disproportionate
amount of time on the Ninth Circuit. My primary goal has been to
show that students interested in appellate court decisionmaking need
to appreciate the nature of the decisionmaking process within appel
late courts, which is the focus of the Cohen study. But students also
need to appreciate that appellate courts are constrained institutions,
and that those constraints significcintly affect the manner in which
courts transform preferences into doctrine. There is much work to be
done here, and this Review has barely scratched the surface. Cohen
has written a valuable book - one that I recommend. The book
reveals important synergies between and among sociology, economics,
and statistics and probabilities in evaluating federal circuit courts. I
hope that other academics, as well-steeped in these and related disci
plines as Cohen is in his, will also take up the cause of applying the
tools of their trade to these unique and important institutions.

61. See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again:
Revisiting the Power Pageant of the Justices, 86 M INN. L. REV. 131 (200 1 ) (concluding that
Justice Kennedy is "most dangerous"); Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous
Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 63 (1 996) (same).
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APPENDIX

TABLE 1 : EFFECT OF SIZE OF MINI-EN BANC PANEL ON PROBABILITY OF ACHIEVING A CONTRARY RESULT FOR INCREASING LEVELS OF
CONSENSUS WITHIN 28 JUDGE EN BANC COURT

Number of28 En Banc Judges Voting "yes "
Size of Mini

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

En Banc Panel

�
""

s:

11

0.3800 0.2693 0.1753 0.1027 0.0524 0.0221 0.0069 0.0012

�

13

0.3624 0.2389 0.1400 0.0706 0.0290 0.0087 0.0014

15

0.3427 0.2066 0.1058 0.0434 0.0128 0.0021

g
;::

17

0.3200 0.1717 0.0728 0.021 9 0.0035

19

0.2928 0.1 333 0.0422 0.0070 .

21

0.2582 0.0908 0.0164

. 23
25

Cr.2 1 1 1 0.0444
0.1389

27
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<::;-
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Each entry in the table represents the cumulative probability of achieving a result contrary to that of the full en bane court of 28, assuming an odd num
bered mini-bane panel of sizes 11 through 27, and degree of consensus within the full court varying from a bare majority to unanimity. All probabilities are
derived from the hypergeometric distribution. The function is accessible on Excel (choose HYPGEOMDIST from the list of statistics functions), and then
by summing the separate probabilities for each possible level of consensus on the mini-en bane that is contrary to that of the full en bane court. The empty
boxes represent impossible results (i.e., results of probability 0.0).
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TABLE 2: PROBABILITY THAT 11 JUDGE MINI-EN BANC ACHIEVES CONTRARY RESULT FOR INCREASING LEVELS OF CONSENSUS WITHIN 28

-..I
'-0
0

JUDGE EN BANC COURT

Number of "yes" votes Among 28 En Banc Judges

Number of

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

"yes" votes
among 1 1
mini en
banc}udf{es
5

0.2400 0.1879 0.1331 0.0838 0.0455 0.0202 0.0066 0.0012

4

0.1091 0.0671 0.0366 0.0171 0.0065 0.0018 0.0003

3

0.0273 0.0129 0.0052 0.0017 0.0004 0.0001

2

0.0035 0.0012 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000

1

0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

0

0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

Prob. of

0.3800 0.2693 0.1753 0.1027 0.0524 0.0221 0.0069 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

contrary
result

Each entry in the table states the probability of a mini en bane panel of 1 1 attammg an outcome contrary to that of the full 28 judge en
bane court for each level of consensus within both courts. A contrary outcome for the mini en bane is achieved whenever a majority of the full court and a
minority of the mini en bane (represented by the smaller number of combinations of 6-5, 7-4, 8-3, 9-2, 10-1, 1 1-0) vote for the same outcome, represented in
the table as "yes." The empty boxes represent impossible results (i.e., results of probability 0.0). The probabilities are calculated from the hypergeometric
distribution. The final row, presented in bold, represents the cumulative probability for all possible voting combinations within a mini en bane panel of 11 of
achieving a result contrary to that of the full 28 judge en bane court for each level of consensus within the full court. This balded row is reproduced as the
first row in Table 1 . Subsequent rows in Table 1 present the cumulative probabilities for all odd numbered mini en bane panels of increasing size of achiev
ing a result contrary to that of the full 28 judge en bane court for each level of consensus within the full court using the same technique.
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